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GENDERED SUBJECTS OF TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE
KATHERINE M. FRANKE*
Transitional societies must contend with a range of complex
challenges as they seek to come to terms with and move beyond an
immediate past saturated with mass murder, rape, torture, exploitation,
disappearance, displacement, starvation, and all other manner of human
suffering. Questions of justice figure prominently in these transitional
moments, and they do so in a dual fashion that is at once backward and
forward looking. Successor governments must think creatively about
building institutions that bring justice to the past, while at the same time
demonstrate a commitment that justice will form a bedrock of governance
in the present and future. This is no easy task, and shortcuts, both in dealing
with the past and in building a just future, often appear irresistible. In
Martha Minow's words, justice at this juncture amounts to replacing
"violence with words and terror with fairness," 1 and steering a "path
between too much memory and too much forgetting."2
The template of mechanisms available to undertake transitional
justice are familiar to those who work in this field: prosecutions (domestic
and international); truth and reconciliation commissions; lustration (the
shaming and banning of perpetrators from public office); public access to
police, military and other governmental records; public apology; public
memorials; reburial of victims; compensation or reparation to victims
and/or their families (in the form of money, land, or other resources);
literary and historical writing; and blanket or individualized amnesty. In
most cases, justice demands the deployment of a number of these tools,
given that no one of them can adequately address and repair the injuries of
the past nor chart a fully just future. Transitional justice will always be both
incomplete and messy.

* Professor, Columbia Law School. This Essay was originally prepared for the
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) meeting on gender and transitional
justice, held in Bellagio, Italy, on March 17-20, 2005.
1 MARTHA M1Now, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 2 (1998).
2 Id. at

4.
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Justice is, of course, a very complex ethical, legal, institutional, and
emotional problem, and its aspirations are rendered all the more difficult in
transitional societies that are struggling with unstable governance, security,
and economic institutions. To better illuminate these complexities,
particularly as they relate to gender, I will borrow a framing device from
political scientist Nancy Fraser. In Justice Interruptus, Fraser discusses one
of the key dilemmas of justice projects: whether they should be
fundamentally committed to redistribution or recognition. 3 Justice as
redistribution is a familiar concept entailing the reordering of material and
symbolic resources based upon a particular account of culpability, desert,
accountability, injury, and fairness. These transitional justice projects could
be primarily committed to redistributing money or land (in the form of
reparations), but they could also redistribute shame (from the injured to the
injurer) or power-resources that might be best understood as symbolic and
cultural. By contrast, justice projects that emphasize recognition seek the
establishment of official bodies, be they courts, tribunals, officially
appointed commissions, or boards of inquest, whose task it is to find facts,
and, more importantly, recognize, acknowledge, or call up the identities of
the parties and acts that are brought to their official attention. The facts to
be recognized may be culpability, harm, injury, or causation. Individual
identities to be recognized would be that of criminal, victim, conspirator, or
rights-holder, while the identity of particular criminal practices may be
recognized as well, such as genocidal, gender, or ethnic-based crimes.
Of course, a preference for redistribution over recognition, or vice
versa, does not tell you which of the tools of transitional justice to prefer.
Courts can both recognize and redistribute, as can truth and reconciliation
commissions that possess the power to order reparations. However, I think
it fair to say that while transitional justice mechanisms can undertake either
or both justice as redistribution and justice as recognition, at the end of the
day most of them end up accomplishing more recognition than
redistribution. I will elaborate this conclusion at greater length below, but I
offer it up front for consideration in order to ask an allied question: what are
the particular benefits of recognition-based justice projects for the
advancement of the interests of women and of gendered justice? Given that
I do not think existing contexts of transitional justice have delivered much
in the way of redistributive justice, I do not regard it a less useful exercise
3Nancy Fraser, From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a
"Postsocialist" State,

in

JUSTICE
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"POSTSOCIALIST" CONDITION 11-39 (1997). See also NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH,
REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?: A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE

(2003).
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to compare and then rank recognition and redistribution. So too, under ideal
circumstances, I would expect that we would pursue both of these forms of
justice simultaneously.
If the platforms of transitional justice were to be evaluated with
respect to their structural capacity to deliver "justice," surely formal, legal
prosecutions of those responsible for the injustice of the past rank high in
most people's estimation. To be sure, the injustice that is of concern in this
transitional project is largely limited to violations of human rights, leaving
to other fora the problem of less heinous conduct. Law professor Diane
Orentlicher is among a group of scholars who has staked out the most
emphatic position with respect to the importance of the use of prosecutions
in transitional justice, arguing that international law imposes a duty to
prosecute a prior regime's human rights violations,4 and others have argued
that prosecution is the optimal method of addressing past atrocities.5 These
scholars argue that the "ethically defensible treatment of past wrongs
requires that those individuals and groups responsible for past crimes be
held accountable and receive appropriate sanctions or punishment," 6 and
that prosecution "makes possible the sort of retribution seen by
most
'7
societies as an appropriate communal response to criminal conduct."
Others have criticized the exaltation of the normative value of
prosecutions in the project of transitional justice. After all, the underlying
assumption of these prosecutions is that gross violations of human rights are
crimes. Miriam Aukerman has offered a very thoughtful critique of
Orentlicher and her colleagues, asking whether ordinary crime is really an
appropriate analogy for massive human rights atrocities, what
Kant called 'radical evil?' .'. . Yet are genocide and ethnic

cleansing really just more egregious versions of premeditated
murder? . . . Or are such atrocities qualitatively different from
ordinary crime because of the number of victims involved and

4 Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations ofa PriorRegime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2612-15 (1991).
5 See, e.g., Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of Enforcement

in InternationalCriminalLaw, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 321 (1999).
6 David

A. Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13

ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 43, 53 (1999).
7 Stephen Landsman, Alternative Responses to Serious Human Rights Abuses: Of
Prosecutionand Truth Commissions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 84 (1996).
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because they are typically undertaken or at least countenanced by
state or quasi-state actors for political reasons?8
Without resolving this debate here, it is worth exploring just what
prosecutions can deliver in terms of transitional justice, particularly with
respect to gender-based violations. I ask this question here in relation to
what has happened in the messy world we inhabit, rather than what might
occur in an ideal world of unlimited resources and stable legal institutions.
Of course, sexual violence against women during times of war and social
upheaval is an old story, but until quite recently the masculinity of
international humanitarian law was unable to appreciate how atrocities
committed against women because they are women might amount to a
violation of international humanitarian legal norms. Traditionally, rape has
not been treated as a grave breach or as the actus reus of genocide, but
rather as a crime against dignity and honor. 9 Indeed, the masculinity of
international law has prompted feminist scholars and activists to ask
provocatively whether women were human. 10 Rhonda Copelon, among
others, has argued vehemently that rape of women be treated under
international humanitarian law not merely as inhumane, but "with the same
fervor as are the war crimes which happen routinely to men."'" The last ten
years of transitional justice jurisprudence has radically altered the treatment
of gendered violence under international law. 12 The International Criminal
8 Miriam Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
UnderstandingTransitionalJustice, 15 H. HUM. RTs J. 39, 41-42 (2002).

9Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (declaring that "[w]omen shall be

especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against rape, enforced
prostitution, or any form of indecent assault").
10Lucinda J. Peach, Are Women Human? The Promise and Perils of "Women's
Rights as Human Rights," in NEGOTIATING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 153, 153-96

(Lynda Bell et al. eds., 2001).
11Rhonda Copelon, Women and War Crimes, 69 ST.JOHN'S L. REv. 61, 65 (1995).

12While not passed in connection with transitional justice concerns exclusively,
watershed moments were the adoption of the Vienna Declaration of Violence Against
Women in 1993, the passage of the General Assembly Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, also in 1993, the Commission on Human Rights' appointment of
a Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women in 1994, and the passage of Security
Council 1325 on Women, Peace and Security in 2000. See generally Richard J. Goldstone &
Estelle A. Dehon, Engendering Accountability: Gender Crimes Under International
CriminalLaw, 19 NEw ENG. J. PUB.POL'Y 121 (2003).
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Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have both issued paradigm-shifting criminal
indictments and convictions of men in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia
on the grounds that rape and other forms of sexual and gender violence be
recognized as among the most serious offenses over which these tribunals
have jurisdiction. The cases have recognized that rape and other sexual
violence can constitute genocide, torture, and other inhumane acts.' 3 The
ICTY's Prosecutor's office has committed substantial resources to thinking
through the meaning and manner of prosecuting sexual violence as a war
crime, including the appointment of a legal advisor for gender-related
crimes and the development of special procedural protections 14 "both in
relation to evidentiary rules for prosecuting gender crimes and affording
protective measures to safeguard the physical and mental well-being of
victims of and witnesses to those crimes." 15 These tribunals have
established compelling precedent that led to the ratification of the Rome
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, which explicitly
recognizes rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy,
gender-based persecution, sexual enslavement, enforced sterilization,
and
6
sexual violence as war crimes and crimes against humanity.1
So, in many fundamental respects, international humanitarian law
has come a long way in acknowledging the gendered components of
violence during war. These advances, however, have been more symbolic
than revolutionary in nature. Although the ICTR found that sexual violence
13 Press

Release, U.N. Trial Chamber, Judgment of Trial Chamber II in the
Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic Case, U.N. Doc. JL/P.I.S./566-e (Feb. 22, 2001),
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p566-e.htm (finding for the first time that rape can be
prosecuted as a crime against humanity and torture); Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No.
IT-96-23 & IT-96-21/1, Judgment Transcript, 6556, 6559 (Feb. 22, 2001) (recognizing that
rape could be used as an "instrument of terror, an instrument they were given free rein to
apply whenever and against whomever they wished"); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No.
IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 172 (Dec. 10, 1998) (finding rape to violate the laws and customs
of war); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,

688 (Sept. 2, 1998)

(finding, for the first time, rape to be an act of genocide when committed with the intent to
destroy a particular group).
14 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 96, U.N. Doc. IT/32 (1994),

reprintedin 33 I.L.M. 484 (1994).

15Goldstone & Dehon, supra note 12, at 123.
16 Rome

Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 27, July 17, 1998, U.N.

Doc. A/ CONF. 183/9.
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could constitute a form of genocide in the Akayesu decision, it has done
little to follow it up in terms of prosecuting sexual violence. The ICTR's
Prosecutor's office has been widely criticized for failing to investigate
sexual violence and rape, and for problems with training investigatory staff,
providing witness protection, implementing confidentiality protections, and
ensuring security in travel back from Arusha, as well as for inappropriate
cross-examination, inadequate17 counseling for victims, and the lack of
sanctions for improper judges.
The ICTY has been subject to similar criticisms. Notwithstanding
its efforts to be sensitive to the particular concerns that inhere in the
prosecution of sexual violence, victims of rape and other sexual violence
who have come before the Tribunal have felt themselves more silenced than
heard by the Tribunal's judges. In lodging this critique, scholars and
activists have argued that rules of relevance, establishment of culpability,
efficiency of judicial resources, and protection of the due process rights of
defendants all cut against victim-witnesses telling their stories. Forced to
testify to their experiences by answering prosecutors' questions in a "yes"
or "no" manner, and interrupted by judges when their testimony veered
beyond the immediate question of the culpability of the individual
defendant, many victims of sexual violence who have testified before the
ICTY have found their experiences as witnesses humiliating and
disrespectful. 1 8 Justice for these witnesses entails the public telling of their
stories and a sense that they are being heard. But this kind of truth-telling is
not within the jurisdiction of formal legal fora. The translation of human
suffering into a vocabulary and a form that is acceptable and appropriate to
a judicial proceeding can be a dehumanizing experience, not only for
victims of sexual violence, but particularly for them. In this regard, Fiona
Ross's observations about the dilemmas of testifying before a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission apply with equal force to testimony in a judicial
proceeding: testifying can be alienating-it demands that you "pose" your
story for an outside listener. It appropriates the story from the domain of the
intimate interior and externalizes it. 19 In this sense, judicial proceedings,
FOR

17 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STRUGGLING TO SURVIVE: BARRIER TO JUSTICE
RAPE
VICTIMS
IN
RWANDA
§
4
(2004),
available
at

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/rwandaO9O4 [hereinafter

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].

18See, e.g., Marie-Benedicte Dembour & Emily Haslam, Silencing Hearings:
Victim-Witnesses at War Crimes Trials, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 151, 158-60 (2004); ELIZABETH
NEUFFER, THE KEY TO MY NEIGHBOR'S HOUSE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND RWANDA

(2002).
19 FIONA

C.

ROSS,

BEARING

WITNESS:

RECONCILIATION COMMISSION IN SOUTH AFRICA

WOMEN

162-65 (2003).

AND

THE

TRUTH

AND
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like other platforms of transitional 20justice, "instrumentalize[] memories in

its own way, and for its own ends.,
I offer this very brief summary of both the accomplishments and
the limitations of criminal prosecutions of sexual violence as a form of
transitional justice in order to better appreciate the potential for justice as
redistribution and recognition in these fora. With respect to redistribution,
successful prosecutions are not likely to result in a range of remedies that
order the transfer of money, power, or other resources from perpetrators to
victims. Even if all of the wealth of the defendants could be made available
as restitution to their victims, it would be an offensively inadequate
reparation for the harm they have caused to their victims. Whether these
prosecutions are successful in redistributing shame from victim to
perpetrator is a separate, and quite complex, question. This redistribution
project is in many contexts undermined by the stickiness of the shame
suffered by female rape victims whose sexual assault during wartime
remains permanently materialized in and through pregnancy and the birth of
a child. As Naomi Cahn notes, "they are often scorned and treated by their
communities as outcasts, while the soldiers who committed the crimes are
welcomed home., 2 1 Surely there should be shame in being found to have
committed radical evil, but whether the actual defendants and the larger
communities in which they live experience these convictions as shameful is
an open empirical question. Of related concern is whether the act of
testifying in court and then witnessing the conviction of those who have
inflicted gross human suffering can alleviate or diminish the shame felt by
the victims of sexual violence, or indeed can shift it from them to their
persecutors. While this too is an open empirical question, the form of the
criminal trial seems an unlikely vehicle for the redistribution of this species
of shame. If, as Giorgio Agamben has argued, the subject "becomes witness
to its own disorder, its own oblivion as a subject," 22 can trials offer the
reconstitution of subjective order and escape from oblivion that the
redistribution of shame requires? As noted above, some of the women who
have testified before ad hoc war crimes tribunals have felt dominated by the
Tribunal's efforts to render their testimony relevant and concise when they
sought to narrate their pain and their suffering. We must consider whether
20

Dembour & Haslam, supra note 18, at 170.

21

Naomi Cahn, Beyond Retribution and Impunity: Responding to War Crimes of

Sexual Violence, 1 STAN. J. C.R.-C.L. 217, 220 (2005).
22

106 (1999).

GIORGIO AGAMBEN, REMNANTS OF AUSCHWITZ: THE WITNESS AND THE ARCHIVE
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the act of testifying in court shares a dynamic with the underlying acts
being testified to, such that in both contexts "women's bodies become sites
of the visible enactment of power, [and] shame is produced as the
residue., 23 It is no new story that testifying in court can create a second or
compound form of victimization for people who have suffered sexual
violence.
If the possibility for redistributive justice is limited in the criminal
prosecutorial context, what about the values of justice as recognition? The
ICTY and ICTR have broken new and important ground in the recognition
of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, genderbased persecution, sexual enslavement, enforced sterilization, and sexual
violence as among the most serious forms of war crimes. This is no small
achievement, and cannot be minimized. It now goes without sayinglargely because important legal authorities have said it-that the kind of
harm caused by this sort of sexual violence is normatively and legally on a
par with the kinds of harm that men have traditionally suffered in war and
in grossly unjust societies.
In a sense, however, the recognition of this kind of gender-based
harm has come at a cost to the individual women who, as witnesses in
Akayesu, Kunarac, Furundzyia, and similar cases, provided the judges with
the scripts they needed to bridge the old and new understanding of gender
and transitional justice. Any women could have done it, and in that sense
the witnesses were fungible to a larger project of establishing a gendered
dimension to international humanitarian law. In this sense, war crime
tribunals as instruments of transitional justice operate best on the wholesale,
not retail level. In the context of mass atrocities, the tribunals cannot come
close to delivering "perfect justice" by establishing culpability and
accountability for all of the actors who caused egregious harm in the past.
Instead, the tribunals have to settle for a minority of cases that can be used
to establish important precedent, identify important kingpins or
masterminds of the violence, or, in many cases, whomever they can get
their hands on. 24 Witnesses in these cases are invaluable resources in the
23Ross, supra note 19, at 63.
24In the ICTY, for instance, the Prosecutor's office has indicted a combination of
"Masterminds" and middle level actors, yet two important leaders-Radovan Karadzic,
former President of the Bosnian Serb administration, and Ratko Mladic, former Commander
of the Bosnian Serb army-have been indicted but not taken into custody by the ICTY.
Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-I, Indictment (July 1995). By contrast,
the Special Court for Sierra Leone has a mandate to prosecute only those who "bear the
greatest responsibility," as opposed to those "who bear responsibility." Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915/Annex; Statute of the
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production of wholesale justice, but the individuals become less important
than the larger principles which their testimony helps establish. The ICTR
provides ample evidence of this perverse fact of transitional justice through
prosecution. Having established a novel and expansive rule of gendered
justice in Akayesu, it is an open question what effect the doings in Arusha
have had for the retail justice that is struggling to take place in the Gacaca
system almost a thousand kilometers away in Rwanda. Some have argued
that it has had almost no effect at all, beyond the symbolic level. 25
Criminal prosecutions, whether in the ad hoc tribunals or by the
ICC, must surely be one component of a comprehensive program of
transitional justice, yet standing alone they necessarily fall short in
delivering full justice for gender-related atrocities of the recent past. The
translation of human suffering into the language of law and rights will
always satisfy the interests of legal authorities more than those who are
called to narrate their pain. The presentation of the injured self in legal fora
does not necessarily produce a healed self, for the treatment of witnesses is
by its very nature appropriative. In important respects, courts are consumers
of the memories of others. Courts "gather" and "collect" evidence,
prosecutors "present" witnesses, witnesses "deliver" testimony and "give"
proof. To bear witness requires that victims pose themselves and their
memories in a way that allows them to be harvested by judicial actors in the
service of larger goals of justice. Healing the witness is not and cannot be
the court's concern.2 6 What is more, bearing witness in the service of
healing requires an empathic listener, someone to hear and affirm suffering.
Yet, this kind of empathic listening is not the listening of a judge-an
International Criminal Tribunal

for Rwanda art.

1, Nov. 8, 1994, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/955/Annex.
25See Alana Erin Tiemessen, After Arusha: Gacaca Justice in Post-Genocide
Rwanda, 8 AFR. STUD. Q. 57 (2004); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 17, § 4; INT'L
CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE: THE FIRST

EIGHTEEN MONTHS (2004).

26 Some scholars have expressed great doubt about the possibility for forgiveness
and healing of domestic violence and sexual assault through mediation and other means
through which the victim can confront her abuser in formal settings. See, e.g., Brenda V.
Smith, Battering, Forgiveness and Redemption, 11 AM. U. J. OF GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L.
921 (2003). This is despite a rich literature that has grown out of the therapeutic
jurisprudence movement. See, e.g., Astrid Birgden, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Sex
Offenders: A Psycho-Legal Approach to Protection, 16 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. &
TREATMENT 351 (2004); Astrid Birgden, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The Role of Forensic
Psychology, in CONSIDERING CRIME AND JUSTICE: REALITIES AND RESPONSES 166 (Rick Sarre

& John Tomaino eds., 2004).
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objective arbiter tasked with deciding what happened.2 7 Thus, from the
victim's perspective, the recognition-based justice that is possible in
criminal prosecutions may bear, at best, an orthogonal relationship to the
injured person's need to remake the world so as to be "able to
recontextualize the narratives of devastation and generate new contexts
through which everyday life may become possible., 28 Some scholars have
launched an allied criticism of truth and reconciliation commissions to the
extent that they privilege certain kinds of memory practices that find their
roots in the United States and Europe and do not have cultural resonance in
communities that value "forgive and forget" methods of collective
healing. 9
Instead, criminal prosecutions-at their most sensitive to gender
issues-recognize women as victims of sexual violence, and the women
who come before the court must perform a kind of sexual vulnerability in
order to be so seen as victims by the court. Fiona Ross has noted that
women's testimony has taken one of two forms. On the one hand, they
operate as expert witnesses regarding the treatment of the men in their
lives-husbands, sons, etc. They are the repositories of memory, not
victims in and of themselves. On the other hand, where women have
personally suffered a number of violations, legal authorities tend to focus
only on, or principally on, the sexual molestation. 30 It is worth noting that it
is rare for criminal tribunals to treat gender-based atrocities as anything
other than sexual violence against women. Of course, men too are victims
of sexual violence, and women are victims of gendered violence that is not
sexual. However, the treatment of gender-based violence has been reduced
in many contexts to the incidence of sexual violation of women. The
reduction of gender to the sexual and the ignorance of how men can suffer
gendered violence is, to be most generous, a form of overcompensation for
the years of ignoring women's place in humanitarian law. Yet this
27

See, e.g.,

SHOSHANA FELMAN

& DORI

IN LITERATURE, PSYCHOANALYSIS, AND HISTORY
28 Veena

LAUB, TESTIMONY: CRISES OF WITNESSING

(1992).

Das & Arthur Kleinman, Introduction to

VIOLENCE AND SUBJECTIVITY

6

(Veena Das et al. eds., 2000)
29
TRUTH AND

See, e.g.,

ROSALIND SHAW, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, RETHINKING

RECONCILIATION

COMMISSIONS:

LESSONS

FROM SIERRA

LEONE

1 (2005),

availableat http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr130.pdf.
30

Ross, supra note 19, at 86-88. These observations were made with respect to the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, but they apply with equal force to
criminal tribunals.
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overcompensation has had the effect of sexualizing women in ways that fail
to capture both the array of manners in which women suffer gross injustice,
as well as the ways in which men suffer gendered violence as well. What is
more, to see the "gender issue" surface only in the case of sexual violence is
to elide the gendered dimensions of war, violence, and the investment in
killing over caring.
Further, this problem of mis-recognition or over-recognition creates
a structural tension related to healing and justice: narrating sexual violation
according to the strict rituals of legal testimony renders it all the more
difficult for these victims to script new social possibilities and to claim a
self who has a future, and is not tethered to a painful past. This, in the end,
is among the central goals of transitional justice--coming to terms with the
past in a way that helps chart a future that moves beyond that past. This is
among the greatest challenges to transitional justice mechanisms: how to
honor the injuries and crimes of the past while creating the possibilities for
new ways of being in the future.
The scripted performance that many women are expected to
perform as witnesses in criminal trials implicates another dilemma that
inheres in the project of gendered justice during periods of social and
political transition. War crimes tribunals, truth and reconciliation
commissions, and other public mechanisms of transitional justice have
complex objectives, but one of them is surely the project of reshaping a
post-conflict national identity. These institutions serve to lay down a
baseline; they mark out a past the society hopes neither to forget nor to
return to. The first stages of transition are typically highly dynamic,
characterized by a "representational gap" where different narratives of the
recent past battle to be dominant. Often women's stories, women's
memories, and women's experiences are appropriated in the service of this
rebuilding project. A popular identification with selected aspects of
women's suffering can be quite powerful. For instance, their sexual
violation can come to stand for the violation of the nation as a whole. So
too, the fact that the nation's men were unable to protect "their" women
from the violence of the recent past can be rendered as a metaphor for the
emasculinization of the culture more broadly. Writing about the immediate
post-World War II period in Germany, Heide Fehrenbach observed that
"[i]n the wake of defeat and occupation, German men lost their status as
protectors, providers, and even (or so it seemed for a short time) as
procreators: the three Ps that had traditionally defined and justified their
masculinity."'3 1 In this period in German history, Fehrenbach is concerned
3
Heide Fehrenbach, Rehabilitating Fatherland: Race
Remasculinization,24 SIGNS 107, 109 (1998).

and

German
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with excavating how masculinity, fatherhood, and nation were explicitly
linked to one another, and how the manipulation and appropriation of
narratives of women's suffering provided a narrative anchor for the
remythologization of a national masculinity.
Different versions of this kind of problem can be found in many
post-conflict societies. At the end of the genocide in Rwanda, for example,
the society had become radically feminized-that is, women outnumbered
men by overwhelming ratios.3 2 This imbalance has been rectified in part
through the return of Hutu refugees who had fled Rwanda over a period of
years.33 However, ongoing imbalances, coupled with explicit requirements
for women's representation in the national parliament, risk "feminizing" the
society in ways that are likely to be met with strong efforts to remasculinize
Rwandan culture. In this regard, the motifs and rituals of cleansing after war
need to bear close attention to their gendered and counter-gendered
implications. There is a rich literature analyzing this dynamic in post-war
Germany that urges due care and attention to the ways in which masculinity
and femininity get articulated in the process of restoring post-conflict
national identity.34
In different ways, and by different means, rebuilding post conflict
societies is almost inevitably a process of re-masculinization. Left
untended, this process can take the form, for instance, of reinstalling men as
good citizens by and through the ideological redefinition of "women's
place," or of formulating new political leadership in the form of a "national
father." Those who have studied post-war Germany have observed how
rebuilding the vaderland was converted into a project of establishing a land
offathers.3 5
While these concerns should be attended to with respect to all of the
mechanisms of transitional justice, they have particular purchase in the

32 See REPUBLIC OF RWANDA NATIONAL CENSUS SERVICE, THE GENERAL CENSUS OF

POPULATION AND HOUSING: RWANDA: 16-30 AUGUST 2002: REPORT ON PRELIMINARY
RESULTS (2003), availableat www.grandslacs.net/doc/2816.pdf.
33 See ANNA OBURA, NEVER AGAIN: EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IN RWANDA

35 (2003), availableat http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001330/133051 e.pdf.
34 See, e.g., Fehrenbach, supra note 31, at 29; ROBERT G. MOELLER, PROTECTING
FAMILY: WOMEN AND MOTHERHOOD IN THE POLITICS OF POST WAR GERMANY (1993);
Elizabeth Heineman, The Hour of the Woman: Memories of Germany's 'Crisis Years' and
West German National Identity, 101 AM. HISTORICAL REV. 354 (1996); Susan Jeffords, The
Remasculinization of Germany in the 1950s: Discussion, 24 SIGNS 163 (1998).
35 Fehrenbach, supra note 31, at 117.
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context of criminal prosecutions for gross injustice from the immediate
past. To the extent that criminal tribunals tend to expect and solicit
testimony of sexual violation from female witnesses, women become
figured in collective memory as particular sorts of victims that encourage
popular identification with selected aspects of women's experience. This is
not to say that the culture should ignore the reality of sexual violation of
women. Rather, we should appreciate how the testimony provided to
criminal tribunals amounts to an appropriation of the meaning of women's
suffering-they lose control of giving meaning to that suffering both for
themselves and for the role it may play in the shaping of collective memory.
Law itself tends to be a particularly masculinist practice, elevating
rationality and objectivity over context and nuance, preferring process to
substance, master-narrative to nuance, and being generally ill suited to the
kind of empathic listening that would transform the speaking self into a
healing self.36 Even where law's masculinity has been constrained, as in for
instance the adoption of special procedural and evidentiary protections
related to the prosecution of sexual violence, we must be realistic in our
expectations of the kind of gendered justice that it can deliver.
None of this is to say that we should abandon criminal prosecutions
as a key instrument in the transitional justice toolbox. Rather, transitional
justice should be viewed as a critical practice and an ongoing experiment in
which future applications of its methodologies should benefit from the
lessons learned from our previous efforts.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has sought to apply lessons
learned from the ICTY and ICTR ad hoc tribunals. A hybrid court, located
in Sierra Leone rather than extraterritorially (as were the two ad hoc
tribunals), it will try cases against those who "bear the greatest
responsibility" for violations of international humanitarian law since
November 30, 1996, and is expected to complete its business within three
years of its establishment in 2002. Perhaps most importantly, what
distinguishes the Sierra Leone Special Court from the ad hoc tribunals is the
fact that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up to operate

36 See,

e.g.,

CAROL SMART, FEMINISM AND THE POWER OF LAW

(1989); Richard

Collier, Masculinism, Law and Law Teaching, 19 INT'L J. Soc. LAW 427 (1991).
37 The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Establishment of

a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, Annex: Agreement between the United Nations and the
Government of SierraLeone on the Establishment of a Special Courtfor SierraLeone, 2,
U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000).
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parallel to the legal prosecutions. " The Commission began its public
hearings in April 2003 and issued a final report to President Ahmad Tejan
Kabbah in October 2004. Not unlike the South African TRC, the TRC in
Sierra Leone has promoted the healing and reconciliatory powers of verbal
remembering that can complement the adversarial methodologies and
culpability aims of the Special Court. Some have been skeptical, if not
critical, of public verbal memory practices as a tool of transitional justice in
cultures, such as that of Sierra Leone, that place greater cultural value on
"forgiving and forgetting" than on public truth telling. 39 At the same time,
the TRC's proceedings highlighted structural injustices that local activists
had sought to reform for some time-particularly those relating to gender
inequalities in Sierra Leone's family and property laws. 40 The TRC's final
report included in its explicit mandate:
The Commission, primarily through the testimonies it received
from women and girls, seeks to find answers as to why such
extraordinary violence was perpetrated against women. Did the
origins lie in the cultural and traditional history of Sierra Leone,
where women were afforded a subservient status to men? Did the
low status of women in socio-political life make them easy
targets? Or is it because men still perceive women to be chattels,
possessions belonging to them, symbols of their honour, making

them the deliberate targets of an enemy determined to destroy the
honour of the other? The answers probably lie somewhere in a
combination between all of these factors.41
38 This is not the first time that these two platforms of transitional justice have been
set up simultaneously, but it holds out the hope of greater success than the dual track process
put in place in Timor-Leste. See, e.g., PIERS PIGOU, INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, CRYING WITHOUT TEARS: IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN TIMORLESTE:
COMMUNITY
PERSPECTIVES
AND
EXPECTATIONS
(2003), available at

http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/Timor-Leste.pdf.
39 S1AW, supra note 29, at 1.
40

See Amnesty Int'l, Briefing Paper: Sierra Leone, No One to Turn to: Women's

Lack
of
Access
to
Justice
in
Sierra
Leone
(2005),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/stopviolence/document.do?id=ENGAFR510112005;
Amnesty
Int'l et al., Sierra Leone Government Urged to Implement the Recommendations of the Truth
and
Reconciliation
Commission
(TRC)
(2005),
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/sierra-leone/document.do?id=ENGAFR510122005
[hereinafter Amnesty Int'l, TRC].
41 SIERRA LEONE'S TRUTH

&

RECONCILIATION COMM'N,

3B

REPORT OF THE SIERRA LEONE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

at http://www.trcsierraleone.org/pdf/start.html.

WITNESS TO TRUTH:

87 (2004), available
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The extensive findings promulgated by the TRC offered complex
accounts of how social, legal, political, and cultural forces conspired to
render women more vulnerable to a range of outrages and degradations in
the war in Sierra Leone. In contrast to the lack of sensitivity to the issues of
women and girls displayed by the South African TRC,42 the Sierra Leone
TRC consulted local and international women's advocates early and often,
and formulated special rules of procedure that were designed to address the
particular needs of female witnesses. 43 The TRC made strong
recommendations with respect to legal, political, educational, and economic
reforms that would strengthen the position of women in Sierra Leonean
society and would render them less vulnerable to future victimization.44 It
urged the repeal or reform of all statutory and customary laws that
discriminated against women, the passage of new laws requiring all
political parties to ensure that at least thirty percent of their candidates for
all national and local elections be women, and recommended that Sierra
Leone ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women.
Unfortunately, President Kabbah has moved slowly to implement
the reforms contained in the TRC's final report.45 Yet, the TRC findings
complement the prosecutions undertaken by the Special Court. The Court's
prosecutor has made a deliberate effort to charge forced marriage as an
inhuman act and crime against humanity under the Court's statute, and has
identified sexual violence as one of the Court's priorities.46
It is too early to draw conclusions about the degree to which Sierra
Leone's two-track process is better able to address the under- and misrecognition problems of the past as these two fora, undertaken as
compliments to one another, aim to minimize the limitations to community
and group healing and justice that they each must bear. Yet, the Sierra
Leone TRC and Special Court have absorbed lessons learned from the
gender-based mistakes of prior attempts to accomplish post-conflict
42

See, e.g., Ross, supra note 19, at 20-26.

43 3B WITNESS To TRUTH, supra note 42, at 88-92.
44 2 Id. at 168-76.
45 Amnesty Int'l, TRC, supra note 39.
46

Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor,

Prosecutor Welcomes Arraignment of RUF and AFRC Indictees on Charges Related to
Forced Marriage (May

17, 2004), http://www.sc-sl.org/prosecutor-051704.html;

Press

Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone, Office of the Prosecutor, Statement of the
Prosecutor on International Women's Day (Mar. 8, 2005), http://www.scsl.org/Press/prosecutor-030805.pdf.
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reconciliation through hearings and prosecutions, and have sought to strike
a new balance between the aims of recognition and redistribution that each
platform can reasonably offer.

